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WHEN DOES A WORK INFRINGE THE 
DERIVATIVE WORKS RIGHT OF A 
COPYRIGHT OWNER? 
AMY B. CoHEN* 
Consider the following fact situation: A, an artist, designs art 
work and registers the copyright in that art work. A then licenses P 
to publish note cards using the art work. The note cards are pub­
lished by P and distributed to retail card stores. T purchases sev­
eral hundred cards and then takes each card, glues it carefully to a 
ceramic tile, and sells the tiles for a profit as "tile art" that purchas­
ers can use to decorate walls, counters, even floors. If A now sues T 
for copyright infringement, how should the court rule? Has Tin­
fringed A's copyright? 
In addressing cases involving facts much like these, the courts 
have split. In Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co., 1 the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the creator of the tile art had infringed the art­
ist's exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon her 
copyrighted art work.2 That decision has been followed by two dis­
trict courts in the Ninth Circuit in Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co.3 
and Greenwich Workshop v. Timber Creations. 4 On the other hand, in 
Lee v. A.RT. Co.,5 the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the tile art 
creator, concluding that the tile art was not an infringing derivative 
work and that the defendant was entitled to make and sell the tile 
art without incurring liability to the artist in accordance with the 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I would like to 
thank Dean Donald Dunn for supporting this project with a research grant. I would also 
like to thank Professor Mark Lemley, University of Texas School of Law, for his comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article. Finally, I want to thank my husband and daughters for 
all their love and support. 
1 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). 
2 As provided by section 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright owner has 
"the exclusive right to do and to authorize" the preparation of "derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994). A "derivative work" is defined by 
the statute to be 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musi­
cal arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a 
whole, represent an original work of authorship, a "derivative work". 
Id. § 101 (definition of "derivative work"). 
3 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), affd, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994). 
4 932 F. Supp. 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
s 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
623 
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first sale doctrine reflected in section 109(a) 6 of the Copyright Act 
of 1976 ("1976 Copyright Act" or "1976 Act"). 
These differing outcomes have implications for copyright law 
that go far beyond the simple fact pattern involved. In fact, many 
of the policy assumptions that underlie copyright law are at stake in 
deciding which of these outcomes is proper. At its core, this fact 
pattern forces the courts to address the question of just what it 
means to provide an artist with copyright protection. Is the artist 
thereby ensured that any meaningful economic exploitation of the 
copyrighted work is subject to her control, or is copyright protec­
tion to be defined more narrowly, and if so, subject to what limita­
tions? What are the limits of the personal property rights of those 
who purchase material objects that contain works protected by 
copyright? 
This Article will address these questions, using the tile art sce­
nario as the focal point. Part I describes generally the goals of 
copyright law and the historical development of the copyright 
owner's right to control the creation of so-called "derivative works." 
Part II focuses on the Mirage and Lee decisions and the reasoning 
used by these courts to reach their different outcomes. Part III 
critiques both of these decisions and places them in the context of 
other pertinent case law and commentary. Part IV provides anal­
ternative approach to analyzing these issues. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE DERIVATIVE WoRKS RIGHT 
A. General Background on Purposes of Copyright Law 
It is considered axiomatic that copyright law is intended to 
provide authors with sufficient protection so that they will be able 
to reap economic rewards from their creations. This protection is 
justified not merely to compensate authors for their labors, but to 
provide potential authors with the incentive to create works in or­
der to enrich public knowledge and well-being. 7 As the Constitu-
6 Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular 
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized 
by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell 
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord. 
17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
7 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors, but' [t]o promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts.' [T]o this end, copyright assures authors the right 
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and in­
formation conveyed by a work.") (citation omitted); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("This limited grant [of copyright] is a means 
by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the 
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tion provides, Congress is given the power to ensure for limited 
times the rights of authors and inventors in order to "promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts. "8 This balance between 
compensating authors and promoting the public interest in access 
to works of authorship has been described as the "incentives-access 
paradigm."9 
Throughout the history of American copyright law Congress 
and the courts have struggled to define the right way to balance 
the author's interest in compensation and the public's interest in 
access. At every point along the line of copyright decision making, 
the question of balancing incentives and access has played a role, 
be it in the context of determining the scope of protectable subject 
matter, 10 the duration of copyright,U or the standards used to de-
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow 
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive con­
trol has expired"). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright 
Protection of Works of Information, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1805, 1866 (1990); William M. Landes & 
Richard A Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989); 
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REv. 
989, 990-95 (1997); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 
1197, 1197-1204 (1996); Christine Wallace, Overlapping Interest in Derivative Works and Com­
pilations, 35 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 103, 104-07 (1984). 
s U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
9 Glynn Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 
483 (1996). Professor Lunney critiques the law's reliance on the incentives-access para­
digm by illustrating, in economic terms, its underlying paradox: to the extent the law limits 
copyright protection for those works most valued in order to serve the interests in public 
access, it also limits the incentives available to authors to create those most valued works. 
See id. at 554-71. Professor Lunney suggests that instead of relying on the incentives-access 
paradigm, copyright law should be shaped by notions of allocative efficiency. He argues 
that copyright law should provide only that degree of protection necessary to promote 
parity between the economic value of copyrightable works and other products which have 
comparable social value. To the extent copyright law provides too much protection, it 
encourages overproduction of works at the expense of other valuable products; on the 
other hand, if copyright protection is too narrow, then there will be underproduction of 
copyrighted works and overproduction of other products. According to Professor Lunney, 
the limited empirical evidence available suggests that copyright law should prohibit only 
exact or nearly exact duplication in order to strike the right balance and promote alloca­
tive efficiency. See id. at 594-656. See also Lemley, supra note 7, at 993-1000, 1013-29 (ana­
lyzing the economic incentives justification and its effect on the creation of derivative 
works); Sterk, supra note 7, at 1204-09. 
1o For example, in Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990),Judge Easterbrook, 
in analyzing the scope of protection granted to nonfiction works, observed that 
[i]ntellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on 
the work of others .... Once a work has been written and published, any rule 
requiring people to compensate the author slows progress in literature and art, 
making useful expressions "too expensive," forcing authors to re-invent the 
wheel and so on .... 
Yet to deny authors all reward for the value their labors contribute to the 
works of others also will lead to inefficiently little writing, just as surely as exces­
sively broad rights will do. 
Id. at 1540-41. Having recognized this paradox and the need for the law to strike an appro­
priate balance as best it can, the court relied on the idea-expression dichotomy and the 
differences between fictional and nonfictional works to rule in favor of the defendant. See 
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termine infringement. Our focus will be on this last question, and 
more particularly, on the question of what kinds of uses of copy­
righted material will infringe the copyright in that material in addi­
tion to actual copying of the work itself. 
B. Historical Development of the Author's Right to Control the 
Preparation of Derivative Works 
In the early American copyright statutes the description of the 
rights provided to copyright owners was quite narrow. The first 
statute provided to authors of "any map, chart, book or books" the 
sole rights only of "printing, reprinting, publishing or vending" 
those works. 12 Even when musical compositions were added to the 
list of protectable works in 1831, the author of such works was not 
given a right to control performances of those works, but only the 
rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing or vending" sheet music 
representing those compositions. 13 
As applied by the courts, these rights did not even protect an 
author against an unauthorized translation of her work into an­
other language, as Harriet Beecher Stowe learned when she unsuc­
cessfully sued the author of an unauthorized German translation of 
her classic novel, Uncle Tom's Cabin. 14 In rejecting her claim, the 
court reasoned that the "only property ... which the law gives to 
[the copyright owner] is the exclusive right to multiply copies of 
the particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes 
of another the ideas intended to be conveyed."15 In other words, 
copyright protected against only visually perceptible reproductions 
also Warner Bros. v. American Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (analyzing the 
scope of protection afforded characters and observing that copyright law "has the capacity 
both to augment and diminish creativity. By assuring the author of an original work the 
exclusive benefits of whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law obviously 
promotes creativity. At the same time, it can deter the creation of new works if authors are 
fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be substantially similar to preexist­
ing works."). See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 347-53; Lunney, supra note 9, at 
506-26. 
11 In justifying the change, from the Copyright Act of 1909 to the Copyright Act of 
1976, to a term of copyright measured by the life of the author plus 50 years, Congress 
relied upon both longer life expectancy of authors, see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134 
(1976) ("The present 56-year term is not long enough to insure an author and his depen­
dents the fair economic benefits from his works."), and the effect an insufficiently long 
term would have on authors' incentives to produce, and thus the public interest in the 
production of, and access to, works of authorship, see id. ("[T]oo short a term harms the 
author without giving any substantial benefit to the public .... In some cases the lack of 
copyright protection actually restrains dissemination of the work, since publishers and 
other users cannot risk investing in the work unless assured of exclusive rights."). 
12 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). 
13 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. 
14 See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 13,514). 
15 /d. at 206-07. 
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of the copyrighted work. "A translation may, in loose phraseology, 
be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but 
in no correct sense can it be called a copy of her book."16 
It was not until1856 that Congress began to expand the scope 
of the copyright owner's rights, albeit slowly. In 1856 Congress for 
the first time provided that dramatic compositions could obtain 
copyright protection and further provided that the owner of such a 
copyright had the "sole right to act, perform, or represent the 
same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any 
stage or public place."17 That is, even where no physical copy had 
been made of that dramatic composition, one who performed the 
work on any stage or public place without the permission of the 
copyright owner would infringe the copyright. Thus, it was no 
longer an essential element of every form of copyright infringe­
ment that the plaintiff prove that the defendant had "multipl[ied] 
copies of the particular combination of characters"18 used by the 
plaintiff. Even more significant changes came in 1870, when Con­
gress provided that "authors may reserve the right to dramatize or 
translate their ... works,"19 and in 1891, when Congress granted to 
authors the automatic rights of dramatization and translation of 
literary works, without the need of reservation.20 Thus, by the end 
of the nineteenth century Congress was beginning to expand the 
scope of the copyright owners' rights; it w~ now clear that copy­
right law could be used to protect against more than just verbatim 
copies of an author's works. 
The really dramatic shift in the scope of protection occurred, 
however, early in the twentieth century when Congress enacted the 
1909 Copyright Act and provided explicitly that a copyright owner 
had the exclusive right not only to "print, reprint, publish, copy 
and vend the copyrighted work,"21 but also to 
translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, 
or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to drama­
tize it if it be a non-dramatic work; to convert it into a novel or 
other non-dramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt it 
if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be 
a model or design for a work of art . . . . 22 
16 /d. at 208. 
17 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870). 
18 Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 207. 
19 Act of july 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 (repealed 1909). 
20 See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1107 (repealed 1909). 
21 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1 (a), 35 Stat. 1175 (repealed 1976). 
22 /d. § 1 (b) (emphasis added). The expansion of the copyright owner's rights to in­
clude a derivative works right is also described in Ralph S. Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are 
HeinOnline -- 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  628 1999
628 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 17:623 
In other words, a copyright could be infringed when a two-dimen­
sional design was transformed into a three-dimensional work or 
when a piece of music was adapted or arranged for use with differ­
ent instruments or voices or when a literary work was changed 
from one language to another or from one category to another 
(dramatic to non-dramatic or vice-versa). 
This expansion of the copyright owner's rights can be ex­
plained in both philosophical terms and economic terms. It may 
reflect an expanded idea of the nature of art and the creative pro­
cess;23 it may also reflect a recognition of new economic markets 
that authors could exploit, for example, motion pictures or sound 
recordings, and that Congress thought should be reserved to au­
thors and not to the public at large.24 Whatever the explanation, it 
is clear that the author's rights were expanded and that courts now 
had new problems to solve in determining infringement of those 
rights. Just how similar did a dramatization have to be in order to 
infringe the rights in a novel? Did the plaintiff's actual language 
have to appear, for example, as dialogue in the dramatization, or 
were just plot and character similarities sufficient? As the courts 
struggled with these questions, some were conservative, only find­
ing infringement in limited circumstances,25 but as more time 
Derivative Works Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARoozo ARTs & ENT. LJ. 1, 2 (I984); Ginsburg, 
supra note 7, at I874, I88!HI8; Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copy­
right, 30 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'v 209, 211-I5 (I983); Lunney, supra note 9, at 534-46; Naomi 
Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REv. I213, 1233-39 (1997); Wallace, 
supra note 7, at 105-10; Michael Wurzer, Note, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare 
Derivative Works: Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REv. I52I, I522-26 (I989). 
23 See Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichot­
omy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value judgments, 66 IND. LJ. I75, 203-10 (I990); Ginsburg, 
supra note 7, at I88I-90; Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1254-55. 
24 See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 2II, 2I6-18 ("[T]he subsequent growth in legitimate 
theaters, motion pictures and television opened vast new markets for derivative uses, impel­
ling Congress to grant derivative rights to copyrighted works and to grant copyright protec­
tion to the derivative works created .... "); Voegtli, supra note 22, at I237-38. 
25 In several early cases involving motion pictures which were alleged to infringe liter­
ary works, the courts found no infringement. In so doing, these courts found that the 
similarities in theme or in common plot devices were insufficient to find infringement. 
The reasoning did not rely so much on notions of the idea-expression dichotomy as on a 
standard for infringement which required that an ordinary observer recognize that the 
film was taken from or based upon the plaintiffs copyrighted work. See, e.g., Kustoff v. 
Chaplin, I20 F.2d 55 I, 559-60 (9th Cir. 194I); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d I, 27-
28 (9th Cir. I933); Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126, I28 (S.D. Cal. I927). 
See generally Lunney, supra note 9, at 537-40. 
On the other hand, in King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924), the 
court found that the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs cartoon character by manufac­
turing toy figures which resembled that cartoon. The court's definition of the scope of 
copyright protection given pursuant to the I909 Copyright Act was quite broad: "Copying 
is not confined to a literary repetition, but includes various modes in which the matter of 
any publication may be adopted, imitated or transferred with more or less colorable altera­
tions. The disguise of the source from which the material was derived does not defeat the 
protection of the copyright .... " /d. at 535. Thus, this court did not focus on audience 
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passed, courts became more willing to find infringement based on 
less obvious similarities between the new work and the work upon 
which it was based.26 The trend of expanding copyright owners' 
rights thus continued. 
Balanced against this expansion of the copyright owner's 
rights, however, were certain legal doctrines that provided limita­
tions on those rights and certain protection for those who used 
copyrighted works. One of the most fundamental of those limita­
tions is reflected in the legal doctrine known as the "first sale" 
doctrine. 
C. First Sale Doctrine 
In the nineteenth century courts recognized that the exclusive 
right of the copyright owner to vend copies of the copyrighted 
work was not limidess. In Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, 27 the 
court reasoned that the copyright owner's right to the intangible 
interest in the intellectual property was to be distinguished from a 
legitimate purchaser's rights in the personal property that con­
tained that intellectual property. 
This copyright incident of control over the sale, if I may call it 
so, as contradistinguished from the sale incident to ownership 
in all property[ ]-copyrighted articles like any other[ ]-is a 
thing that belongs alone to the owner of the copyright itself, 
and as to him so long as and to the extent that he owns the particular 
copies involved. lVhenever he parts with that ownership, the ordinary 
incident of alienation attaches to the particular copy parted with, in 
favor of the transferee, and he cannot be deprived of it. 28 
This reasoning was later relied upon in Harrison v. Maynard, 
Merrill & Co.,29 where the court concluded that there was no copy­
right infringement claim against a party who resold damaged 
recognition but on whether plaintiff's expression had been taken, even if altered and 
disguised. 
26 See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 
1983) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on plot and thematic 
similarities between Star War.s and Battlestar Galactica); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. 
Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that defendant's film infringed plaintiff's 
play, based on plot and thematic similarities); Universal City Studios v. Film Ventures Int'l, 
Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134 (C. D. Cal. 1982) (granting plaintiff preliminary injunction against 
defendant based on plot and thematic similarities between jaws and Great White); Metro­
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op Prods. Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 
1979) (holding that musical-comedy condensed version of Gone With the Wind was an in­
fringement). See generally Cohen, supra note 23, at 220-29; Lunney, supra note 9, at 544-46. 
27 27 F. 914 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886). 
28 Id. at 925 (emphasis added). 
29 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894). 
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books salvaged after a warehouse fire where the copyright owner 
had already conveyed title to those books to the warehouse owner. 
[T]he right to restrain the sale of a particular copy of the book 
by virtue of the copyright statutes has gone when the owner of 
the copyright and that copy has parted with all his title to it, and 
has conferred an absolute title to the copy upon a purchaser, 
although with an agreement for a restricted use. The exclusive 
right to vend the particular copy no longer remains in the 
owner of the copyright by the copyright statutes. The new pur­
chaser cannot reprint the copy. He cannot print or publish a 
new edition of the book; but, the copy having been absolutely 
sold to him, the ordinary incidents of ownership in personal 
property, among which is the right of alienation, attach to it.30 
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 1908 in Bobbs-
Merrill Company v. Straus,31 agreeing with these lower courts that 
once the copyright owner had sold the tangible object in which the 
copyrighted work was expressed, the owner of that tangible object 
had a right to alienate that object without accounting to the copy­
right owner. The Court reasoned that the main purpose of the 
copyright statutes was "to secure the author the right to multiply 
copies of his work"32 and that the statutory grant to the copyright 
owner of the "sole right" to vend copies of the work must be read 
in light of that purpose. As so read, the Court concluded that sell­
ing a legitimately acquired copyrighted book for less than the retail 
price required by the copyright owner might be a breach of con­
tract in some circumstances, but was not itself an infringement of 
the copyright owner's sole right to vend the copyrighted work. 
This so-called "first sale" doctrine was included as part of the 
federal copyright statute in the 1909 Copyright Act. Section 27 of 
that Act provided: 
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material ob­
ject copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or other­
wise, of the material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer 
of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright con­
stitute a transfer of the title to the material object; but nothing in 
this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any 
copy of a copyright work the possession of which has been lawfully 
obtained. 33 
30 Jd. at 691. 
31 210 u.s. 339 (1908). 
32 /d. at 347. 
33 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 27, 35 Stat. 1175 (repealed 1976) (emphasis added). 
The copyright owner's right to distribute the work was reflected in section 1 of the 1909 
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Thus, the law recognized that there was a difference between the 
property interest in the copyrighted work expressed in a material 
object and the property interest in the material object itself and 
that the ownership interests in these two property interests could 
be entirely separate and independent of each other. The copy­
right owner did not automatically have a property interest in the 
material object and thus could not on the basis of the copyright 
statute control further sales or transfers of that object by one who 
had a legitimate property interest therein. 
As construed by the courts, this section and the doctrine it 
reflected provided significant protection to those accused of copy­
right infringement. It was held, for example, that overhauling and 
reconstructing secondhand sets of the copyright owner's books was 
not copyright infringement;34 that rebinding and combining the 
copyright owner's comic books with other comic books was not 
copyright infringement;35 and that repainting and then selling the 
copyright owner's hobby horse was not copyright infringement.36 
In each case the court focused on the defendant's title to the mate­
rial object containing the copyrighted work and the plaintiff's fail­
ure to prove copying by that defendant.37 
This doctrine imposed some limits thereby on the rights of the 
copyright owner to control all the economic benefits that are de­
rived from copyrighted works. Since the legitimate owner of a 
copyrighted book, for example, is free to resell that book and not 
account to the copyright owner for any portion of that resale, the 
copyright owner is denied potential earnings from the sales of his 
or her work. This doctrine is thus an instance where the law chose 
to favor the interests in public access over the interest in maximiz­
ing the incentives provided to copyright owners. 
D. The 1976 Act 
Both the exclusive right of the copyright owner to prepare de-
Copyright Act, which provided the copyright owner with the right to "print, reprint, pub­
lish, copy and vend the copyrighted work." !d. § 1 (emphasis added). 
34 See Bureau of National Literature v. Sells, 211 F. 379 (W.D. Wash. 1914). 
35 See Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publ'g Co., 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
36 See Blazon v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
37 See id. at 420 ("[B]efore there can be infringement there must be both an averment 
and some proof of copying ... , and as a matter of logic there can be no copying in the 
case at bar where the horse seized and alleged to copy [plaintiff's hobby horse] is in fact 
[plaintiff's hobby horse] ... . ");Fawcett Publications., 46 F. Supp. at 718 ("[T]he defendant 
has not multiplied copies but merely resold the plaintiff's under a different cover .... The 
Defendant is not charged with copying, reprinting or rearranging the copyrighted material 
.... "); Bureau of Nat'l Literature, 211 F. at 382 ("[Plaintiff's] exclusive right of sale of a 
particular copy is gone when it parts with the title to such copy."). 
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rivative works and the first sale doctrine were included by Congress 
in its major revision of the federal copyright statute in 1976. Sec­
tion 106(2) of the 1976 Act explicitly provides that the copyright 
owner has the exclusive right to "prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work"38 and to authorize such preparation 
by others. The Act defines a "derivative work" as 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza­
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifica­
tions which, as a whole, represent an original work of author­
ship, is a "derivative work."39 
Congress used language broader than that used in the 1909 Act, 
for not only are additional specific types of derivative works men­
tioned, but the language also includes as a derivative work "any 
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted," a general catchall phrase presumably intended to cover 
those types of derivative works not specifically identified. In this 
way Congress broadened the copyright owner's rights and 
incentives. 
On the other hand, the 1976 Act also specifically provided for 
the first sale doctrine. Although the Act provides the copyright 
owner with the exclusive right to "distribute copies or pho­
norecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or oth~r 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending,"40 that right is 
subject to the limitations provided for in section 109(a) of the Act: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, 
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of 
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.41 
38 17 u.s.c. § 106(2) (1994). 
39 /d. § 101 (definition of "derivative work"). 
40 Id. § 106(3). 
41 Id. § 109(a). Since the original enactment of the 1976 Act, Congress has amended 
section 109 to limit the scope of the first sale doctrine with respect to commercial rentals of 
certain types of works. Section 109 now provides in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by the own­
ers of copyright in the sound recording or the owner of copyright in a com­
puter program (including any tape, disk, or other medium embodying such 
program), and in the case of a sound recording in the musical works embodied 
therein, neither the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in pos­
session of a particular copy of a computer program (including any tape, disk, 
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What happens when this first sale doctrine and the rights it 
provides to personal property owners clash with the derivative 
works right and the protection it is intended to provide to copy­
right owners? That is, in legal terms, what the tile art situation is all 
about: do the rights of the copyright owner to prepare derivative 
works outweigh the rights of the personal property owner to alter 
and resell the note cards that it has legitimately purchased? 
II. .MIRAGE AND LEE AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS? 
A. Cases Decided under the 1909 Copyright Act 
The difficult questions that arise when the derivative works 
right conflicts with the first sale doctrine are clearly illustrated by 
two older cases addressing similar fact situations and reaching op­
posite conclusions. First, in National Geographic Society v. Classified 
Geographic, Inc., 42 the District Court of Massachusetts ruled that the 
defendant had infringed the plaintiffs copyrights in its magazines 
by cutting out articles, compiling and binding together articles on 
similar subjects, and then selling these bound volumes to the pub­
lic. Even though the defendant had not copied any of the plain­
tiff's articles, but had just resold the pages cut from magazines that 
the defendant had legally acquired, the court concluded that the 
defendant had infringed the plaintiffs copyright by violating the 
plaintiffs exclusive right to "compile, adapt or arrange its copy­
righted work."43 The court rejected the suggestion that, as owners 
of lawfully acquired secondhand copies of the plaintiffs magazine, 
the defendants were entitled, on the basis of the first sale doctrine, 
to create and sell these adaptations. 
In contrast, three years later in Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Elliot 
Publishing Co.,44 the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York relied on the first sale doctrine in concluding that the defend­
ant in that case was not liable for copyright infringement when it 
purchased secondhand copies of the plaintiffs copyrighted comic 
books and rebound them with other comics, some belonging to 
the plaintiff and some to third parties. The court observed that 
or other medium embodying such program) may, for the purposes of direct or 
indirect commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the 
possession of that phonorecord or computer program ... by rental, lease, or 
lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or 
lending.... . 
17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). These changes indicate some expansion of the copyright 
owner's rights and some contraction of the personal property owner's rights. 
42 27 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1939). 
43 Id. at 659. 
44 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
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"the defendant has not multiplied copies but merely resold the 
plaintiff's under a different cover. The exclusive right to vend is 
limited. It is confined to the first sale of any one copy and exerts 
no restriction on the future sale of that copy."45 
The court neither cited nor referred to the National Geographic 
case, though it did conclude its opinion by stating that the defend­
ant had not been charged with "copying, reprinting or rearranging 
the copyrighted material."46 Unlike the defendant in National Geo­
graphic, which had separated articles from the issues in which they 
appeared and then combined with other articles from other issues, 
the defendant in Fawcett had taken whole comic books and com­
bined them with other whole comic books without taking anything 
apart. Although that factual difference can explain the different 
outcomes, it is also possible to argue that the individual magazine 
articles as separate whole works were no more "rearranged" than 
the Fawcett comic books.47 
That critical point has been the key distinguishing issue be­
tween those cases that have ruled in favor of plaintiffs and those 
ruling in favor of defendants when the derivative works right has 
clashed with the first sale doctrine. The outcome in these cases 
most often has depended on whether or not the court has treated 
the defendant's use as a "rearrangement" or "transformation" in­
fringing the derivative works right. 
For example, in C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan,48 the first "tile art" 
case, the defendant had used a process to transfer the plaintiff's art 
work, expressed on cards and other objects purchased by the de­
fendant, to ceramic plaques. First, the court considered whether 
this process involved copying. The court concluded that it did not, 
as it involved the use of plaintiff's actual image on the ceramic 
plaque. In reaching this conclusion, the court also considered it 
significant that "[e]ach ceramic plaque sold by defendant with a 
Paula print affixed thereto requires the purchase and use of an 
individual piece of artwork marketed by the plaintiff."49 In other 
words, Paula would receive compensation for every copy of her 
work used and sold by the defendant. 
45 Id. at 718. 
46 /d. (emphasis added). 
47 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F. 3d 1381, 1389 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (en bane) ("If you make verbatim copies of 95 pages of a 316-page book, you 
have not transformed the 95 pages very much-even if you juxtapose them to excerpts 
from other works and package everything conveniently."). See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. 
v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) (treating one article in magazine as 
"whole work" for purposes of fair use analysis). 
48 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 
49 /d. at 191. 
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The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that defendant's ce­
ramic plaques were adaptations over which the plaintiff was given 
exclusive rights pursuant to section 7 of the 1909 Copyright Act. In 
response to the plaintiff's reliance on National Geographic, the court 
noted that that case had never been cited with approval. The court 
concluded that the process used by the defendant did not result in 
a "compilation, adaptation, or arrangement as those terms are con­
templated by Section 7 of the [1909] Copyright Act,"50 and that 
"while an individual is afforded the protection necessary to allow 
exploitation of other media,"51 the law did not proscribe the ac­
tions taken by the defendant in creating the ceramic plaques using 
the plaintiff's copyrighted art. Beyond that, the court did not ex­
plain why the use of the art on the plaques did not fall within that 
area of protection afforded copyright owners. 
Finally, the court relied on the first sale doctrine to protect the 
defendant against the plaintiff's claim that its exclusive right to 
vend its copyrighted work had been infringed. The court observed 
that once the copyright owner has consented to the sale of copies 
of its work, 
continued control over the vending of copies is not so much a 
supplement to the intangible copyright, but is rather primarily a 
device for controlling the disposition of the tangible personal 
property which embodies the copyrighted work. Therefore, at 
this point the policy favoring the copyright monopoly for au­
thors gives way to the policy opposing restraints of trade and to 
restraints on alienation.52 
AS we will see in the next section, addressing cases decided under 
the 1976 Copyright Act, not all courts tipped the scales in this same 
direction. 
B. Mirage and Its Progeny 
In Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co.,53 the Ninth Circuit 
considered a fact situation remarkably similar to that addressed by 
the Paula court. The defendant had purchased books containing 
copyrighted art prints and then cut out the prints, glued them to 
ceramic tiles, and sold the tiles. The plaintiffs were the copyright 
owners and licensees of the prints used by the defendant, and 
claimed that the defendant, by creating the tile art, had, inter alia, 
50 Id. at 192. 
51 /d. 
52 Id. at 191 (quoting M. NIMMER, CoPYRIGHT§ 103.3 (1972)). 
53 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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infringed the derivative works rights of the copyright owner. The 
court agreed: 
What [defendant] has clearly done here is to make another ver­
sion of [plaintiff's] art works, ... and that amounts to prepara­
tion of a derivative work. By borrowing and mounting the 
preexisting, copyrighted individual art images without the con­
sent of the copyright proprietors ... [defendant] has prepared a 
derivative work and infringed the subject copyrights.54 
In response to the defendant's contention that the tile art was not 
a derivative work, the court pointed to the language in section 101 
of the 1976 Act defining a derivative work as one in which a work is 
"recast, transformed or adapted," and concluded: 
By removing the individual images from the book and placing 
them on tiles, perhaps the [defendant] has not accomplished 
reproduction. We conclude, though, that [defendant] has cer­
tainly recast or transformed the individual images by incorporat­
ing them into its tile-preparing process.55 
The court also rejected the defendant's assertion that the first 
sale doctrine protected its further sales of the art prints contained 
in the books that had been legally acquired. The court reasoned 
that the first sale doctrine did not provide the personal property 
owner with a right to prepare derivative works, but only the right to 
transfer the material object itself. "The mere sale of the book to 
the [defendant] without a specific transfer by the copyright holder 
of its exclusive right to prepare derivative works, does not transfer 
that right to the [defendant] ."56 
Thus, by treating the tile art as a "derivative work," the court 
could find infringement and avoid the protection given personal 
property owners through the first sale doctrine. In two subsequent 
decisions involving similar facts, the district courts within the Ninth 
Circuit have followed Mirage and ruled for the plaintiffs. First, in 
Muiioz v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co.,57 the same defendant had taken 
individual note cards which contained the plaintiff's copyright art 
work and had mounted those cards on ceramic tiles. The defend­
ant then made the same arguments made in Mirage: that the tile art 
was not a derivative work and thus was protected by the first sale 
doctrine. The defendant this time claimed that the tile art was 
54 Id. at 1343 (citations omitted). 
55 /d. at 1344. 
56 /d. 
57 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), affd, 38 F.3d 1218 (1994). 
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merely a means of displaying the art work, no different from plac­
ing art work in a frame. The court disagreed: 
Placing a print or painting in a frame and covering it with glass 
does not recast or transform the work of art. It is commonly 
understood that this amounts to only a method of display. 
Moreover, it is a relatively simple matter to remove the print or 
painting and display it differently if the owner chooses to do so. 
Neither of these things is true of the art work affixed to a ce- · 
ramie tile. Moreover, these tiles lend themselves to other uses 
such as trivets (individually) or wall coverings (collectively).58 
The court thus concluded that the tile art was an infringing deriva­
tive work and ruled in the plaintiff's favor. 
Similarly, in Greenwich Workshop v. Timber Creations, 59 the Dis­
trict Court of the Central District of California ruled in the plain­
tiff's favor, relying on both Mirage and Munoz, even though the 
facts in this case were somewhat different. In Greenwich, small scale 
reproductions of watercolor paintings were published in a book in 
which the plaintiff owned the copyright. The defendant had cut 
the reproductions out of the book and then transposed them on to 
canvas, matted, framed and sold them as individual pictures. The 
plaintiff claimed that by so doing, the defendant had created unau­
thorized derivative works and thus infringed its copyright. 
The defendant responded by relying on the language in 
Munoz, which distinguished the infringing tile art from the non­
infringing act of framing a picture for display. The defendant ar­
gued that its conduct amounted to nothing more than an "alterna­
tive method of display"60 and was not the creation of a derivative 
work. The defendant further asserted that to be a derivative work, 
something "substantially different"61 had to be created. The plain­
tiff responded by distinguishing framing a work from defendant's 
conduct, which involved permanently removing the art reproduc­
tions from the book first and adapting them into works to be hung 
from the wall. 
The court agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant had cre­
ated derivative works and thus infringed its copyright. The court 
reasoned that the defendant had "clearly 'recast' and 'trans­
formed' [the book] by physically removing the pages and adapting 
them into works of art to hang on the wall,"62 and that this conduct 
58 /d. at 314. 
59 932 F. Supp. 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
60 Id. at 1213. 
61 ld. 
62 Id. at 1215. 
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was "not equivalent to simply framing a work of art for display 
purposes."63 • 
These cases demonstrate how, by broadly defining the deriva­
tive works right, the courts can provide the copyright owner with 
expansive protection and limit the effects of the first sale doctrine. 
In the next section, we examine a case in which the court took a 
different approach; by imposing a higher threshold for defining a 
derivative work, the court provided narrower protection to copy­
right owners and broader rights to the personal property owner 
relying on the first sale doctrine. 
C. Lee v. A.R T. Co. 
In the most recent "tile art" case, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, and then the Seventh Circuit, took a 
different approach to the issues dealt with in Mirage and its prog­
eny. In Lee v. A.R T. Co.,64 the defendant had purchased the plain­
tiffs copyrighted note cards and then mounted them on to 
ceramic tiles and sold them as "tile art." The plaintiff sued for 
copyright infringement, arguing that her right to prepare deriva­
tive works had been infringed and citing Mirage and Munoz as 
support. 
The district court first rejected the distinction between fram­
ing art and mounting it on tiles that had been relied on in Munoz. 
The district court reasoned that 
[b]oth framing and tiling utilize the same works purchased 
from the copyright holder and do not involve "copying" as de­
fined by the Copyright Act. Both processes involve trimming 
the original image to fit it to the appropriate size of the tile or 
frame respectively, securing the image to the tile or mat with 
some type adhesive [sic] or clip, and covering the art with a 
clear covering, epoxy resin and glass respectively.65 
The district court further observed that "the eventual manner of 
display and the 'use' of a product is not dispositive"66 of the issue of 
whether a work is a derivative work. 
According to the district court, "the only relevant query for 
the court is whether ART's ceramic tile process transforms, adapts or 
recasts Annie Lee's original work into a new and different original 
63 Jd. 
64 Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub nom. Lee v. A.R.T. 
Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
65 Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. at 580. 
66 /d. 
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work."67 The district court concluded that unless the defendant's 
work was itself sufficiently original to be copyrightable, it could not 
be a derivative work and thus could not be an infringement of the 
plaintiff's exclusive right to prepare derivative works.68 
Having concluded that a work was not an infringing derivative 
work unless it was original, the district court then applied the stan­
dard to the tile art created by defendants and concluded that since 
it was not original, it was not infringing. 
The mundane act of placing notecards onto a ceramic tile falls 
into the narrow category of works in which no creative spark 
exists. Thus, the ceramic tiles are not a new and different origi­
nal work, but the same exact work placed onto a different back­
ground. ART did not display any creativity in gluing Annie 
Lee's work onto the separate surface .... No intellectual effort 
or creativity was necessary to transfer the notecard to the tile. It 
does not meet the definition of a "derivative work."69 
Ironically, since the defendants were not creative, they were 
granted more protection against liability than if they had been. 
Since the defendants had not infringed the derivative works 
right as analyzed by the district court, they were then able to rely 
on the first sale doctrine to insulate themselves from liability for 
merely reselling the material objects they had legitimately acquired 
when purchasing the plaintiff's note cards. The district court ob­
served that 
ART made no changes, alterations, reproductions, transforma­
tions, or adaptations of the notecards and, instead, resold the 
67 Id. (emphasis added). 
68 The district court based this conclusion on the statutory definition of a "derivative 
work" and on C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973), discussed supra 
notes 48-52, and a more recent case, Paramount Pictures Cmp. v. Video Broad. Sys., 724 F. 
Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989). 
In Paramount, the defendant had added commercials to the blank lead-in tape on 
videocassettes containing plaintiff's copyrighted motion pictures, and plaintiff sued, claim­
ing that defendant had infringed its exclusive right to prepare derivative works. The court 
rejected the claim that adding the commercials constituted creation of a derivative work 
because "[t]he plaintiff has not presented any authority to support the conclusion that the 
mere addition of a commercial to the front of a videocassette recasts, transforms, or adapts 
the motion picture into what could represent an 'original work of authorship.'" /d. at 821 
(emphasis added). 
Interestingly, the Paramount court had distinguished the case before it from Mirage, 
finding that adding commercials to a videocassette did "not resemble in any way the re­
moving of a page from an artwork book and mounting it onto a tile as a separate piece of 
art for sale." Id. The Lee court failed to mention that observation in its own reliance on 
Paramount. Instead, the Lee court placed weight on the use of the word "original" by the 
Paramount court in concluding that a work could only be considered an infringing deriva­
tive work if it met the standards of originality. See also infra text accompanying notes 107-
111. 
69 Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. at 581. 
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same notecards using a different method of display. This resale 
is permissible under the Copyright Act.70 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judg­
ment for the defendant, though on slightly different grounds. 71 
First, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, seemed to conclude 
that even if the "tile art" was itself a "derivative work," it should not 
be considered an infringement of Lee's copyright because "an al­
teration that includes (or consumes) the original lacks economic 
significance."72 As in the Paula case, the court found it significant 
that the defendant had to purchase a copy of the plaintiffs art for 
every piece of tile art it sold. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause 
the artist could capture the value of her art's contribution to the 
finished product as part of the price of the original transaction, the 
economic rationale for protecting an adaptation as 'derivative' is 
absent."73 The court therefore seemed to be urging an economic 
effects analysis as the best test for determining when a use of a 
copyrighted work constituted an infringement of the derivative 
works right. 
The court did not, however, end its analysis there. It went on 
to consider whether in fact the tile art was a "derivative work" as 
defined by the statute. Judge Easterbrook agreed with the district 
judge that there was no difference between framing a work of art 
and mounting it on tiles for purposes of determining copyright in­
fringement, and that therefore the Ninth Circuit's reliance on that 
distinction was misplaced. Judge Easterbrook went further in criti­
cizing the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit by observing thar that 
court had "erred in assuming that normal means of mounting and 
displaying art are easily reversible. A painting is placed on a 
wooden 'stretcher' as part of the framing process; this leads to 
some punctures ... , may entail trimming the edges of the canvas, 
and may affect the surface of the painting as well."74 The Seventh 
Circuit rejected the notion that the permanence of the changes 
made by the derivative artist should determine whether or not the 
work made is a derivative work. 
70 Id. at 582. The District Court of Puerto Rico has agreed with the Lee district court 
that a derivative work must itself be original in order to be infringing. See Precious Mo­
ments, Inc. v. La Infantil, 971 F. Supp. 66 (D.P.R. 1997) (holding that bedding items manu­
factured with lawfully acquired fabric with plaintiff's copyrighted design were non­
infringing derivative works due to absence of any originality in such bedding items). 
71 See Lee v. A.R.T, 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
72 Id. at 581. 
73 Id. This view has recently been criticized in Note, Copyright Law-Derivative Works­
Seventh Circuit Holds That Mounting Copyrighted Notecards on Ceramic Tiles Does Not Constitute 
Pret;.aration of Derivative Works in Violation of the Copyright Act, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1365 (1998). 
4 Lee, 125 F.3d at 581. 
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The Seventh Circuit did not, however, rely on the lower 
court's demanding definition of "derivative work" to justify judg­
ment for the defendant. Judge Easterbrook recognized that there 
was a split in the case law and in scholarly commentary with respect 
to whether a new work itself had to be "original" in order to in­
fringe the derivative works right, but then concluded that 
"[f]ortunately, it is not necessary for us to choose sides."75 For pur­
poses of the decision, the court instead assumed that a non-origi­
nal work could be an infringing derivative work if it fit within the 
first sentence of the statutory definition of a derivative work, i.e., "a 
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla­
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which the work may be recast, 
transformed or adapted."76 The court then concluded that the tile 
art did not fall into any of the specified categories, nor did it "re­
cast", "transform" or "adapt" the plaintiff's art work. Judge Easter­
brook observed that " [ t] he art was bonded to a slab of ceramic, but 
it was not changed in the process. It still depicts exactly what it 
depicted when it left Lee's studio."77 To hold such a minor altera­
tion infringing would lead to a slippery slope, the court feared, 
resulting in liability for those who used the note cards as note pa­
per on which to write or as coasters for their drinks. The Seventh 
Circuit refused to define copyright law in a way that would allow 
artists to "block any modification of their work of which they disap­
pr.<?ye"78 and affirmed the district court's judgment for the 
defendant. 
The Lee case thus reflects a far different approach to the bal­
ance between the derivative works right and the first sale doctrine 
than that taken by the Mirage court and its progeny. By imposing a 
more demanding test for when the use of a copyrighted work will 
infringe the derivative works right, the Seventh Circuit granted less 
protection to copyright owners and more to those who purchase 
copyrighted works. 
Thus, the differences between the approach of the Ninth Cir­
cuit and that of the Seventh Circuit reflect different choices as to 
how to balance the rights of copyright owners to control uses of 
their works by others and the rights of others to use and to profit 
75 /d. at 582. 
76 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "derivative work"). 
77 Lee, 125 F.3d at 582. , 
78 /d. 
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from further distribution of such works.79 A look at the scholarly 
comment in this area may help to determine how best to make the 
correct choice in striking that balance. 
III. BAIANciNG THE "DERIVATIVE WoRKS RIGHT" AND THE Pusuc 
INTEREST IN CREATING DERIVATIVE WoRKS 
We have seen that originally copyright owners were only pro­
tected against literal copying of their works; even translating a work 
into another language did not infringe the copyright. Certainly 
transforming a work into another medium did not infringe.80 Sim­
ilarly, copyright law has long provided that once the copyright 
owner has sold copies of its work, those who acquire those copies 
legally are entitled to distribute those particular copies again, 
whether for a price or not.81 
We have also seen, however, that over the last 100 years or so, 
copyright law has expanded the protection given to copyright own­
ers by providing increased rights to control adaptations and trans­
formations of their works from one medium to another.82 Today 
that right is reflected in section 106(2) of the 1976 Act and its pro­
vision that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare 
and to authorize the preparation of derivative works.83 As con­
strued by some courts, that right has given copyright owners tre­
mendous control over those who use their works, even when the 
copies have been legally acquired. 84 
This expansion comes at a cost, both generally to society and 
specifically to those who would create derivative works. In order to 
understand this consequence of the expanded derivative works 
right, it is important to return to the incentives-access paradigm 
and our fundamental beliefs about the importance of copyright. 
The traditional explanation for copyright protection rests on 
an economic rationale: copyright protection is necessary, especially 
given the availability of easy and low cost copying technology, be­
cause copyright owners would face direct competition by those 
79 One author has distinguished the cases factually and reconciled them on that basis. 
Specifically, the author found it significant that in Mirage the defendant had cut the art 
work out of a book whereas in Lee the defendant had mounted notecards sold as individual 
works. The author reasoned that a copyright owner who permits his or her work to be 
included in a collective work does not thereby give away the right to "decompile" that 
collective work and sell the works individually. See Steve Lauff, Decompilation of Collective 
Works: When the First Sale Doctrine Is a Mirage, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1365 (1998). 
80 See supra text accompanying notes 12-16. 
81 See supra text accompanying notes 27-37. 
82 See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text. 
83 17 u.s.c. § 106(2) (1994). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 53-63. 
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copyists who would "free ride" on the copyright owner's creative 
expression and bear only those minimal copying costs. This com­
petition would undermine substantially the copyright owner's op­
portunity to reap financial rewards from the work and thereby 
undermine the incentives to create that work in the first place.85 
Professor Paul Goldstein, one of the leading copyright schol­
ars, has argued that in applying the derivative works right, the 
courts have failed to pay sufficient attention to the incentives struc­
ture underlying the copyright system.86 Goldstein suggested that 
the proper approach to use in determining whether the derivative 
works rights has been infringed "is [to inquire] whether the grant 
of such a right is needed [1] to attract the appropriate amount of 
investment to the underlying work's expression and [2] to channel 
this investment in appropriate directions."87 Unlike a reproduc­
tion, a derivative work may not directly compete with the underly­
ing work and may in fact provide additional benefits to the public 
by building on that original. Before giving the creator of the un­
derlying work too much control, these factors should be taken into 
consideration. 
Professor Stewart Sterk in fact criticized on economic terms 
the expansion of copyright protection through the derivative works 
right.88 He described the incentives justification for such ex­
panded protection as flawed. Although he agreed that "[i]f free­
riding copyists could appropriate the gain associated with works of 
authorship, some authors would find it worthwhile to abandon au­
thorship for other pursuits,"89 he also stressed the costs of copy­
right protection and the extent to which it may discourage, rather 
than encourage, creative efforts: "expanded copyright protection 
increases the cost to authors by requiring them to obtain permis­
sion when they seek to build upon existing work."90 He concluded 
that "the optimal copyright system would not seek to maximize the 
number of works created, but, in recognition of the costs of copy­
right, would withdraw protection even when marginally more pro­
tection would result in a marginal increase in creative activity."91 
As it was then applied to current doctrine, Sterk found that 
85 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
86 See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 252; see also 2 PAUL GoLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT § 5.3 at 
5:79 (2d ed. 1998) ("Derivative rights enable prospective copyright owners to proportion 
their investment to the returns they hope to receive not only from the market in which 
their work will be first published, but from other, derivative, markets as well"). 
87 Goldstein, supra note 22, at 230. 
88 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1204-26. 
89 Jd. at 1207. 
90 Jd. 
91 Id. at 1209. 
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copyright law was tipping too far in favor of protection without giv­
ing due consideration to those costs.92 In the specific case of deriv­
ative works, Sterk concluded that "[t]he broad protection 
copyright doctrine extends to derivative works ... appears gener­
ally inconsistent with the incentive justification for copyright."93 
He reasoned that, except in those cases where the expected earn­
ings from derivative works are disproportionately large compared 
to the expected earnings from the underlying work, a derivative 
works right is not needed to provide the economic incentives to 
create that underlying work.94 The creator will be motivated suffi­
ciently by the earnings expected from that underlying work. 
Professor Glynn Lunney would also define the derivative works 
right more narrowly and would impose a demanding test for in­
fringement of that right. Specifically, Professor Lunney would im­
pose a standard of infringement that would require the copyright 
owner to show exact or nearly exact duplication of the underlying 
work. "[A] ny significant transformation of or variation from the 
underlying work should preclude a finding of infringement even if 
the underlying work remains recognizable."95 Professor Lunney 
justified this demanding test based on notions of allocative effi­
ciency; he concluded that granting the copyright owner broader 
protection would result in the inefficient overproduction of works 
of authorship.96 Of course, by relieving derivative users of liability 
where significant changes are made to the underlying work, Profes­
sor Lunney's approach would, ironically, also encourage the crea­
tion of those new derivative works. 
Professor Mark Lemley made a broader point with respect to 
the policy ramifications of the expanded derivative works right. He 
argued that such expanded protection undermines the public in­
terest in the progress of science and the useful arts by placing ob-
92 See id. at 1209-25. 
93 !d. at 1217. 
94 See id. at 1215-16. Sterk also rejected two other economic justifications for the deriva­
tive works right, which had been suggested in Landes & Posner, supra note 7. The first, 
that a derivative works right enables an author to release a work without delaying to pre­
pare derivative works, Sterk considered flawed based on the argument that with the deriva­
tive works rights authors might delay production of derivative works in order to ensure 
greater sales of the underlying work. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1216-17. As for the second 
Landes and Posner economic justification-that a derivative works right is efficient be­
cause it reduces transaction costs by enabling licensees of derivative works to deal with only 
one copyright holder-Sterk pointed out that without that right, licensees would not have 
to deal with the underlying work's owner at all. See id. at 1217. Cf Landes & Posner, supra 
note 7, at 354-55. See also Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1240-47 (agreeing with Sterk that deriv­
ative rights are not easily justifiable based on economic incentives theory). 
95 Lunney, supra note 9, at 650. 
96 !d. at 646-54. 
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stacles in front of those seeking to create "improvements."97 Like 
Professors Lunney, Sterk, and Goldstein, he reasoned that copy­
right law can be justified on an economic incentive basis "only to 
the extent that on balance [it] encourage[s] enough creation and 
dissemination to offset [the] cost[]" of limiting dissemination of 
ideas and raising the price of those works.98 Moreover, Lemley fo­
cused on the social costs such rights impose on the creation of new 
works that build upon and improve the underlying works: 
"[E]fficient creation of new works requires access to and use of old 
works. And since 'improvements' may in many cases dwarf the 
original work in terms of their practical significance, dynamic mar­
ket efficiency over different generations demands such access as 
well."99 Because the derivative works right impedes such access by 
those who seek to improve a copyrighted work and, more impor­
tantly, denies copyright protection for most improvements if done 
without the permission of the owner of the copyright in the under­
lying work, according to Lemley, this allows the copyright owner to 
capture too much value: not only the value of the underlying work 
but of the improvements as well. 100 
He concluded that this result is inefficient and based on 
flawed assumptions about how copyright owners will behave in li­
censing the creation of "improvements," that is, derivative works. 
Lemley argues that given the realities of the licensing marketplace, 
for example, the transaction costs, the uncertainties, the difficulties 
locating improvers, and the resulting undervaluing of improve­
ments, the current scheme gives too much economic power to 
copyright owners, leading to underproduction of derivative works 
or "improvements."101 
Lemley would remedy this situation by modifying copyright 
law to create a doctrine parallel to the "blocking patent" rule, 
which provides patent protection for inventions added to already 
patented inventions while still holding that new inventor liable for 
infringing the existing patent. 102 Lemley would incorporate this 
concept into copyright law in part by granting copyright protection 
to the original aspects of derivative works even if those works also 
97 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1074. 
98 !d. at 997. 
99 !d. (citations omitted). 
1oo Id. at 1018-24. Lemley contrasts this to the doctrine of "blocking patents" in patent 
law, see id. at 1000-13, and finds no basis for the difference in treatment in copyright law, see 
id. at 102942. 
101 See id. at 1046-72. 
102 See id. at 1000-13. 
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infringe the copyright in the underlying work.103 By adopting such 
a rule, Lemley reasons that the creator of the derivative work will 
have increased bargaining power, thus leading to greater efficiency 
and more appropriate valuation of derivative works. 104 
Thus, there is significant commentary criticizing in economic 
and policy terms an overly broad derivative works right. Given this 
recognition of the need to limit the derivative works rights of the 
creator of the underlying work in order to provide access for new 
works or "improvements" to be made by others,105 it is important to 
return to the district court's analysis in the Lee case and that court's 
test for what constitutes an infringing derivative work. As we have 
seen in the Lee district court opinion, the test is whether or not the 
defendant's work itself is an original work of authorship. If the 
derivative user has not added something "new and different," 
something "original" to the underlying copyrighted work, then ac­
cording to the Lee district court, there is no "derivative work" as 
defined by the statute, and thus the copyright owner's exclusive 
right to create derivative works has not been infringed. 106 
103 See id. at 1073-77. Lemley also argues for using the fair use doctrine to protect "radi­
cal improvers," i.e., those who make such a major tran.sformation of the underlying work 
that the added value relative to the amount of the underlying work copied justifies a hold­
ing of nonliability even in the case of a showing of direct harm to the copyright owner. See 
id. at 1077-83. This concept would not aid the creators of tile art since under Lemley's 
definition it is not a radical improvement over the underlying art work. See also Wallace, 
supra note 7, at 126-31 (arguing that the creator of a derivative work should get copyright 
protection for original contributions, but not for mere transformation of a work into a new 
form or medium). 
104 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1075. 
105 Some of those who see copyright owners as entitled to broad protection may justify it 
on the basis of a natural or personal rights theory. That is, as creator, the author should 
have some control over how and in what form his or her creation is used. Under this view 
an artist is not motivated purely by the desire for economic rewards, but also by the sense 
of personal satisfaction that comes with artistic and personal expression and the public's 
recognition of the work's aesthetic value. That artist may therefore feel entitled to stop 
those who place her art in a commercial context, such as tile art, which offends that artist's 
sense of propriety, regardless of the economics of the matter. See 2 GoLDSTEIN, supra note 
86, § 5.3 at 5:80-81; Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the 
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REv. 1, 25-47 (1988); Ginsburg, supra note 
7, at 1867; Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO 
ST. LJ. 517 (1990). 
One response is that that is not the concern of copyright law, that American copyright 
law does not itself recognize moral rights or reputational interests, but is entirely con­
cerned with providing only sufficient economic rewards to provide incentives to create in 
the interest of public betterment. An artist whose concern is reputational harm should 
instead rely on the law of unfair competition or, in those limited circumstances where it 
applies, the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T., 125 
F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing moral rights in tile art context). See also Lem­
ley, supra note 7, at 1031-34 (concluding that derivative works right serves economic pur­
poses and is not based on moral rights notions); Sterk, supra note 7, at 1230-40 (criticizing 
non-economic justifications for copyright); Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1250-60. 
106 See Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. 576, 580-82 (N.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub nom. Lee 
v. A.R.T., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Lee district court relied on the 
statutory definition of a "derivative work" in section 101 of the 1976 
Act, which provides in pertinent part that "[a] 'derivative work' is a 
work based upon one or more preexisting works ... or [upon] any 
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elab­
orations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an 
original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work."'107 The first sen­
tence· does not even mention originality; only in the second sen­
tence of the definition does Congress specifically mention 
originality as a requirement. While the Lee court and others108 
read this originality requirement to apply in determining if the de­
rivative works right had been infringed, it is better to read that re­
quirement as applicable only in determining if a particular work is 
copyrightable as a derivative work. Although the statute does not 
make this explicit, it makes more sense to require originality only 
in the context of determining copyrightability. 
Moreover, the sources relied upon by the Lee district court 
only discuss the requirement of originality for a derivative work to 
be copyrightable. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act 
stated that a derivative work "is copyrightable if it represents an 'orig­
inal work of authorship. "'109 The cases which were cited by the Lee 
district court are cases in which the courts had ruled that a deriva­
tive work is not copyrightable unless it is original. no 
It is entirely consistent with the general scheme of copyright 
law to require originality before granting copyright protection to a 
107 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of"derivative work") (emphasis added). 
108 Professor Goldstein had disagreed with the notion that to be infringing, a derivative 
work had to be original, and concluded that the statute did not support such a conclusion. 
See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 229-31 & n.75. In his more recent treatise, however, he 
seems now to believe that for a work to infringe the derivative works right, it must itself 
contain original work. "[F]or the derivative right to be infringed, defendant must have 
created a derivative work, and for a derivative work to have been created, the Act requires 
the contribution of expressive content capable of standing on its own as a copyrightable 
work." 2 GoLDSTEIN, supra note 86, § 5.3 at 5:82. For this reason, Professor Goldstein 
concluded that Mirage had been incorrectly decided. See id. See also 2 NIMMER ON Copy. 
RIGHT§ 8.12[C] (1998) (criticizing Mirage for concluding that first sale doctrine did not 
apply because the tile art constituted an adaptation); Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1267-69 
(author would restrict definition of derivative works, in part by including only one that 
"exhibits little originality of its own or that[ ] unduly diminishes economic prospects of the 
works used"). 
109 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) (emphasis added). 
110 These cases did not involve infringement of the right to prepare derivative works, but 
the eligibility of certain works for copyright protection as derivative works. See Woods v. 
Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995) (concerning whether musical arrangement quali­
fies as a derivative work for purposes of statutory protection against termination of trans­
fers); American Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714 (N.D. Ill. 
1996), available in 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5809, No. 92 Civ. 5909 (May 1, 1996) (concerning 
copyrightability of dental coding system), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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work; it is a completely different matter when the issue is infringe­
ment. This rigid and unrealistic insistence that the definition of a 
derivative work for purposes of determining copyrightability also 
be applied when the issue is infringement has also been criticized 
by others. 111 
In fact, it makes little sense to hold only the most creative 
users of copyrighted material liable. Professor Lemley, for exam­
ple, would not apply his "blocking" rule to what he labels "minor 
improvers."112 By this he means derivative works which add noth­
ing sufficiently original to be considered copyrightable.U3 The cre­
ators of these works would therefore not get the benefits of the 
increased bargaining power and, under Lemley's scheme, the copy­
right owner of the underlying work would be entitled to capture 
the full value of that "minor" improvement. As applied to the "tile 
art" scenario, it would thus seem that the owner of the underlying 
artwork should be entitled to hold the "tile art" creators liable for 
copyright infringement, assuming that adding the art work to tile is 
not considered sufficiently original to be copyrightable and is thus 
just a "minor improvement."114 
Both Professors Lunney and Lemley would provide more pro­
tection to the derivative user who has made some significant 
Ill See Elisa Alcabes, Unauthorized Photographs of Theatrical Works: Do They Infringe the Copy­
right, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1032, 1036-38 (1987); Wallace, supra note 7, at 114. Both of these 
authors concluded that the law should impose a different standard for defining an infring­
ing derivative work (substantial similarity) than for defining a copyrightable derivative 
work (originality). According to Wallace, "[p]roof of infringement should be more diffi­
cult, because the protection it gives to authors may impede the free flow of information 
and ideas." Wallace, supra note 7, at 114 (citation omitted). Similarly, Alcabes noted that 
"[t]he higher 'infringement standard' discourages the over-monopolization of original ex­
pression by requiring an author to show more than mere copyrightability in order to prove 
infringement of his derivative rights." Alcabes, supra, at 1036-37. These authors clearly did 
not conclude that the statutory definition of a derivative work defined the test for infringe­
ment of the derivative works right. See also Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 
F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1982) ("A work which makes non-trivial contributions to an existing 
one may be copyrighted as a derivative work and yet, because it retains the 'same aesthetic 
appeal' as the original work, render the holder liable for infringement of the original 
copyright if the derivative work were to be published without permission from the owner of 
the original copyright."); Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971) 
("The tests for eligibility for copyright and avoidance of infringement are not the same.") 
112 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1074. 
113 See id. at 1019-20. 
114 See Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. 576, 581 (N.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub nom. Lee v. 
A.R.T., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Lemley's approach is the opposite of that 
taken in Lee. a creator of an original derivative work is given more, not less, protection in 
infringement actions. Lemley, however, noted that the approach of those courts, such as 
the Ninth Circuit in Mirage, which allows the derivative works right to "preclude owners of 
a particular copy of a work from altering or transforming that copy notwithstanding the 
first sale doctrine ... has been controversial." Lemley, supra note 7, at 1018. He also 
recognized, however, that the first sale doctrine as provided for in section 109(a) of the 
1976 Copyright Act does not apply to the creation of derivative works from the copy ob­
tained after that first sale. See id. at 1018 & n.143. 
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changes to the underlying work than to one who has made no or 
only trivial changes.U5 The less a defendant has contributed to the 
"progress of the useful arts and sciences," the more willing the law 
should be to hold that defendant liable. The approach of the dis­
trict court in Lee does just the opposite: it penalizes only the user 
who has made an original contribution. Thus, from both a policy 
and statutory point of view, the approach taken by the Lee district 
court is questionable. Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the defendant has made an original contribution before holding 
that defendant liable does not make a great deal of sense. Non­
original derivative works should also be considered potentially 
infringing. 
On appeal, the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in the 
Lee case avoided the issue of originality by concluding that the tile 
art was not a derivative work because it did not "recast, transform 
or adapt" the underlying work, since what was depicted in that un­
derlying work had not been changed. Unfortunately, it is not clear 
what the court meant by "changing" what has been "depicted." 
Would a two dimensional photograph of a sculpture "change" what 
that sculpture depicted? Would a photograph change what a 
painting depicted, for that matter? Such uses of art have generally 
been considered infringing, though neither is truly a "copy" of the 
underlying work.U6 The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "re­
cast, transformed or adapted" does not shed much light on where 
the line should be drawn between a use that infringes the deriva­
tive works right and one that does not. 
On the other hand, the approach taken by the Mirage, Munoz, 
and Greenwich courts to define "recast, transformed or adapted" is 
also subject to criticism. These courts concluded that cutting art 
work out of a book and matting it or placing note cards on ceramic 
tiles was infringing, as the art work was thereby "transformed." The 
opinions distinguished these activities from simply framing a pic­
ture based in part on the permanence of the change made by the 
115 See supra notes 95-96 & 102-04 and accompanying text. 
116 See, e.g., Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 F. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1907) (holding that photograph 
of statue infringes copyright in statue). Cf Leigh v. Warner Bros., 10 F. Supp.2d 1371 (S.D. 
Ga. 1998) (holding that party was not lawfully allowed to photograph sculpture in ceme­
tery without owner's permission); Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, 741 F. Supp. 1107 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding photograph of sculpture to be a derivative work based on that 
sculpture), vacated, 760 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Varon v. The Santa Fe Reporter, 218 
U.S.P.Q. 716 (D.N.M. 1982), available in 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17359 (concluding that 
artist had right to require permission before her paintings were photographed); MJ. 
Golden & Company v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 137 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (holding 
sketch of three-dimensional plaque to be infringement of copyright in plaque). 
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derivative works creator.U 7 That distinction is not persuasive. It is 
true that once the note cards are glued and lacquered to tiles they 
cannot be used as note cards again; it is also true that reproduc­
tions once cut out of a book cannot be returned to that book. A 
framed picture, on the other hand, can usually be taken out of the 
frame or reframed. But why does this distinction matter in terms 
of determining infringement? The courts simply state without fur­
ther explanation that one is a transformation and the other is not. 
Where is the line to be drawn, and why? Would these courts con­
sider it an infringing transformation if the framer had used an ad­
hesive such as Superglue to attach the mat, glass and frame to the 
art work? That would make the change as permanent as gluing it 
to tile, but should that be enough to render that framer liable? As 
correcdy pointed out by Judge Easterbrook in the Lee opinion, us 
the focus on the permanence of the change would seem to lead to 
ridiculous hairsplitting. Furthermore, it seems to have no connec­
tion with the underlying concerns of copyright law. The perma­
nence of the change itself does not seem to have a connection to 
either the incentives provided to copyright owners or the public 
interest in access to the underlying work. 
Thus, the question remains as to how to define "recast, trans­
formed or adapted." In applying that language to a particular 
work, it is first important to recognize that derivative uses can 
either "consume" the underlying work by incorporating an actual 
copy119 of that work into the derivative work, or can exploit that 
work in a "public goods" mode, meaning uses that allow the deriva­
tive user to purchase only one copy of the underlying work and 
then "replicate the attraction of the underlying work from a single 
copy ... to satisfy many derivative consumers with only one copy of 
the underlying work."120 With public goods uses, the derivative 
user need not incorporate an actual copy of the underlying work 
into each copy of the derivative work produced. When a derivative 
work does not "consume" an actual copy of the underlying work, 
but uses that work in a public goods mode, almost by definition 
that underlying work has been "recast, transformed or adapted," 
117 See supra notes 5~3 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
119 In this context an "actual copy" refers to the copy of the work as fixed by or under 
the authority of the copyright owner into a material object, not a duplication of that copy 
by someone else. Thus, when an artist produces prints of her art work, each print is an 
"actual copy." If someone was to take one of those prints and make duplications by photo­
copying or othe!Wise, those duplicates would not be "actual copies" as referred to herein, 
but reproductions of the actual copy. 
120 Lunney, supra note 9, at 634. 
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since it is being used in a different format or medium. For exam­
ple, a book turned into a movie or a cartoon character turned into 
a plush toy has certainly been "recast, transformed, or adapted." 
Thus, those public goods uses can certainly be considered to fit 
within the statutory definition of a derivative work. 
Should all such uses be considered infringing regardless of 
their originality?121 Professors Goldstein, Sterk, Lunney, and Lem­
ley seem to suggest that such a view could overcompensate the 
copyright owner of the underlying work and cause undesirable 
costs for society, either in terms of general allocation of resources 
or in terms of failing to stimulate the creation of new works based 
on the underlying works. 122 The debate over the actual need for 
copyright protection to stimulate creative efforts is not new, 123 and 
as long as copyright protection continues to exist, there can be no 
real test of copyright's role in stimulating authors to create works 
of authorship. When it comes to public goods uses, however, a de­
rivative user who can make and distribute multiple copies of a de­
rivative work without purchasing a copy of the underlying work for 
each derivative work distributed is reaping significant benefits, 
which should at least be shared with the copyright owner of that 
underlying work. By assuming such users to be liable for copyright 
infringement, the law encourages negotiation between the copy­
right owner and the derivative user instead of allowing the deriva­
tive user to use the work without compensating the copyright 
owner. As both would seem to gain from a license allowing the 
derivative use, a fair accommodation compensating both parties 
may in fact result. Obviously, this is what does occur in the case of 
most films based on novels and most plush toys based on cartoon 
characters: a license agreement satisfactory to both sides is negoti­
ated, and the public benefits from the creation of the new work. 
There does not appear to be a need to deny the copyright owner 
protection in order to stimulate the creation of these new deriva-
121 For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that enough of the original expression in 
the underlying work has been copied by the derivative user so that the derivative work is 
"substantially similar" to the underlying work. See generally Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copy­
right Decisionmaking: The Meaningf£ssness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 719 
(1987). 
122 See supra notes 80.104 and accompanying text. 
123 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case far Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 322 (1970) ("[T]he case for copy­
right ... rests not upon proven need, but rather upon uncertainty as to what would hap­
pen if protection were removed."). Compare Barry Tyerman, The Economic Rationale far 
Cofryright Protection far Published Books: A Reply to Professar Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REv. 1100 
(1971), with Stephen Breyer, Cofryright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REv. 75 (1972). See also 
Landes & Posner, supra note 7. 
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tive works.124 
On the other hand, the issues are different when a derivative 
work does not make a public goods use but instead "consumes" an 
actual copy of the underlying work for each derivative work cre­
ated. Even in such cases, as is the case with tile art, the underlying 
work has arguably been "adapted" and even "transformed" or "re­
cast," as the Ninth Circuit concluded in Mirage. 125 There are, how­
ever, policy reasons to treat these derivative uses differently. 
·Professor Lunney argued that the derivative works right must be 
limited to allow copyright owners to control only those uses that 
reflect a "public good" aspect. Uses that require the derivative user 
to purchase a number of copies of the underlying work reasonably 
proportionate to the number of derivative consumers to be satis­
fied, as in the case of tile art, should not be infringing, according 
to Professor Lunney, because such uses do not affect copyright 
owners significantly or differently in economic terms from deriva­
tive uses of other types of products.126 
Thus, Professor Lunney would not find the creation of "tile 
art" as described in Mirage and Lee to be infringing because it does 
not exploit this "public good" aspect of works of authorship. 127 As 
pointed out long ago in the Paula decision, 128 for every piece of tile 
art created, the defendant must have purchased a copy of the 
plaintiff's copyrighted art work. In this way the plaintiff has some 
control in terms of reaping economic rewards; the copyright owner 
has the benefits of that first sale. That distinguishes this situation, 
for example, from the situation in which the novelist's book is 
turned into a film; that defendant need not purchase a copy of the 
book for every film made. Thus, the novelist has much less of an 
opportunity to control the economic rewards to be derived from 
her work. With tile art, on the other hand, the compensation de­
rived from the first sale may be sufficient to reward the copyright 
owner of that art work. 129 The tile art creator, even if not consid-
124 Professor Lemley's suggestion may be an even better solution: give the derivative 
user copyright protection for any original contributions even if that user is technically in­
fringing the copyright in the underlying work. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 1073-77. Such 
an approach might more fairly balance the negotiations between the copyright owner of 
the underlying work and the derivative user. 
125 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988). 
126 See Lunney, supra note 9, at 634-43. 
127 See id. at 641-43 & 641 n.506. 
128 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Under this analysis the economic ra­
tionale does little to justify an expanded derivative works right in general and certainly 
does not provide a basis for concluding that "tile art" is infringing. 
129 This is similar to the concern expressed in Professor Sterk's comment that a deriva­
tive works right is not needed except where the expected earnings from the derivative 
works are disproportionately large when compared to the expected earnings from the un-
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ered "original," has paid that price and the other costs of manufac­
turing that tile. 
This conclusion, however, is itself based on some questionable 
assumptions. Future artists may now be able to anticipate uses of 
note cards in the form of tile art, but did Lee? Was she able to reap 
the economic rewards of this use of her art by charging an appro­
priate price for its use on the note cards? In Lee, Judge Easter­
brook wrote about the opportunity that the artist had "to capture 
the value of her art's contribution to the finished product as part 
of the price for the original transaction,"130 but was that in fact true 
in that case? Returning to the hypothetical posed at the start of 
this article, when A licensed P to use her art on note cards, did A 
anticipate the extra profits that could be made by Tin making and 
selling tile art? Did Panticipate that value in pricing the note cards 
themselves? 
These questions bring us back to a point made by the Munoz 
court in distinguishing framing a picture from placing a picture on 
ceramic tile. The court considered the first to be a "commonly 
understood . . . method of display" of the art work whereas the 
second was not. 131 Cases interpreting "infringement" have gener­
ally not reflected a concern with customary usage of copyrighted 
works or the expectations of the copyright owner. Rather, that in­
quiry has generally focused on the degree and type of similarity 
between the works. 132 An alternative approach relied upon by a 
few courts133 and favored by some commentators134 asks whether 
the new work supplants demand for the original copyrighted work. 
Although that approach may at first glance seem related to this 
notion of customary use, its focus is on the effect of the new work 
derlying work. As applied to the "tile art" scenario, this reasoning could result in a finding 
of no infringement. The expected earnings from the art work itself might not be out­
weighed by the expected earnings of the "tile art." The artist would not be discouraged 
from creating the artwork if denied the tile art earnings, as long as the rewards from the 
sales of the art work itself were under his or her control. 
130 Lee v. A.R.T., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997). 
131 Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Alaska 1993), affd, 38 
F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994). 
132 See generally Cohen, supra note 121; Goldstein, supra note 22, at 224-26. 
133 See, e.g., West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data, Inc. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that Mead's use of West's page numbers would infringe West's copyright in part because 
"consumers would no longer need to purchase West's reporters to get every aspect of 
West's arrangement"); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic lnt'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that circuit boards which speed up the play of copyrighted video games infringe 
those copyrights in part based on demand for speeded up versions of such games). 
134 See, e.g., Michael Wurzer, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative Works: 
Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1521 (1989); Nadan, A Proposal to Recognize Compo­
nent Works: How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1633, 
1655 (1990). 
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on demand for the original work, not on whether the new format 
used to present the original work is one that the copyright owner 
would ordinarily expect. Professor Goldstein, however, has sug­
gested that the derivative works right in general, as opposed to the 
right to reproduce,135 will be infringed when new expressive ele­
ments have been added (making it thereby more than a reproduc­
tion) and a new market has been created.136 Thus, Goldstein 
suggests that a work, to infringe the derivative works right, must 
appeal to a market different from the one to which the underlying 
work appeals. 137 This question, like that asked by the Ninth Circuit 
in Mirage, seems to focus on whether the derivative user has found 
a new way of exploiting the work, a use perhaps not anticipated by 
the creator of the underlying work in determining the price to be 
charged for the sale or use of that underlying work. 
Perhaps there is in this reasoning a way of reconciling the ap­
proaches of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits. In determining if the 
derivative works user should have to compensate the creator of the 
underlying work for a particular use, Judge Easterbrook would ask 
whether the creator had an opportunity to "capture the value of 
her art's contribution" to that derivative use. If the derivative use is 
a customary non-public goods use of such a work, then it is reason­
able to assume that the creator had such an opportunity, but if the 
derivative use is not customary or is a public goods use of the work, 
then that opportunity to charge a price reflecting that value did 
not exist. Framing a painting is a customary way to resell art work, 
and thus, the creator of that art work should charge a price th~t 
reflects the value to the framer/reseller of that underlying art 
when resold as framed art. Placing note cards on tile and reselling 
it as "tile art" was arguably not customary and thus constituted a 
new market that the artist did not anticipate when she determined 
135 The 1976 Copyright Act provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right to 
"reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994). 
136 See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 217. 
137 See id. at 227-32. In addition to his attention to incentive theory and the market for 
derivative works, see supra text accompanying notes 86-87, Goldstein also argues that deter­
mining infringement of the derivative works right should focus principally on the degree 
and type of similarities in expression between the underlying work and the derivative work 
and whether or not they are substantial. He would limit the copyright owner's control to 
uses of the protectable expression in the underlying work; only derivative uses that substan­
tially reproduce that expression or transform it as necessary to the change in medium will 
be infringing. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 231-32. Goldstein also argued that copyright 
remedies for infringing the derivative works right should be applied carefully so as not to 
provide the copyright owner with more than is necessary to protect its investment in the 
underlying work. See id. at 236-239. Like Lemley, he would provide some greater protec­
tion to those who create original derivative works than the law currently provides. See id. at 
243. 
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the price for her note cards. Thus, when a non-public goods deriv­
ative use is not a customary use, the copyright owner should argua­
bly be entitled to compensation. 
In her discussion of a common law tort for misappropriation 
of intellectual property, Professor Wendy Gordon seemed to sug­
gest a rule that would have the opposite effect.138 One element of 
her suggested tort of "malcompetitive copying" is that the defend­
ant's copying must "take[] sales from plaintiffs actual or expected 
market." Professor Gordon reasoned that if the defendant's use 
had no "competitive nexus" to the plaintiffs actual or expected 
market, then the defendant had not harmed the plaintiff in a way 
that would entitle that plaintiff to restitution. 139 
The competition requirement works to assure that defendant's 
gain is at plaintiff's expense because if the plaintiff is serving, or 
is about to enter the market where the free rider is selling ele­
ments of the plaintiff's work, then allowing the free rider to con­
tinue likely will hurt the plaintiff by taking her customers.140 
Professor Gordon, however, also recognized the limitations of 
this principle and has observed that in the case of copyright and 
derivative works, Congress had taken a broader approach.141 
Gordon has written elsewhere that copyright owners should be en­
titled to revenues beyond these actual or expected markets in cer­
tain circumstances because "it is desirable for authors to be 
responsive to the public demand in new areas as well as established 
ones, and a rule of law that denied authors compensation except to 
their 'expected' markets could cause line-drawing problems that 
would dampen the incentive that new markets would bring."142 
Thus, copyright owners arguably are entitled to compensation for 
harm done by copying in new markets as well as in actual and ex­
pected markets. 
The Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue, but it 
has spoken about the copyright owner's rights to claim harm to the 
"potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"143 in the 
context of fair use determinations. These decisions shed some 
light on what the Court considers to be the market that a copyright 
138 See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992). 
139 Id. at 238-42. 
140 /d. at 239-40 (citations omitted). 
141 See id. at 247-48 & 248 n.377. 
142 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1385 (1989) (citations omitted). 
143 17 u.s.c. § 107(4) (1994). 
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owner is entitled to control and to preclude others from invading 
or harming. For example, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 144 the Supreme Court observed that "the fair use doc­
trine was predicated on the author's implied consent to 'reason­
able and customary use' when he released his work for public 
consumption."145 Thus, a use outside of what is reasonable and 
customary would generally not be considered a protected fair use. 
Moreover, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 146 the Court rea­
soned that a copyright owner does not necessarily suffer lost li­
cense fees from a parody of its work because the copyright owner 
presumably would never have licensed a parody in the first place. 
The Court observed that "[t]he market for potential derivative 
uses includes only those the creators of original works would in 
general develop or license others to develop. "147 The Court thus 
did not limit the copyright owner to uses already anticipated and 
licensed. Rather, it would in addition grant protection in markets 
that the copyright owner was likely to develop. A parody may not be 
licensed because of the unflattering way it presents a copyrighted 
work; but a non-traditional presentation of a work, such as a rap 
version of the copyrighted work at issue in Campbell, was considered 
a market that the copyright owner could protect, even though 
there were no plans to exploit that market at the time of the de­
fendant's allegedly infringing use. 
As applied in the context of the derivative works right, these 
opinions seem to suggest that a derivative use will infringe as long 
as that use invades a market that the copyright owner would be 
likely to exploit if he or she knew about it. In the context of deriva-· 
tive works which "consume" the underlying work, that is, non-pub­
lic goods uses, the derivative user may be able to argue that the 
copyright owner was already compensated for uses it should have 
expected when pricing the first sale of the copyrighted work. How­
ever, that argument falters when the derivative use falls outside of 
those markets and creates a market that the copyright owner did 
not contemplate in pricing the first sale of the copyrighted work, 
but to which the copyright owner is entitled as a market he or she 
would have been likely to develop. 
Thus, the ultimate question to ask in determining if the deriv­
ative works right has been infringed by a non-public goods use of a 
work is not, "Is the derivative work original?" or, "Has a permanent 
144 471 u.s. 539 (1985). 
145 Id. at 592. 
146 510 u.s. 569 (1994). 
147 Id. at 592. 
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change been made?", but rather, "Was this a customary use of a 
particular work?" This is obviously a fact question appropriately 
determined by relevant evidence as to what were customary uses of 
such works. 148 It would seem best to place the burden of proof on 
the copyright owner to prove that a certain use was not customary 
and that therefore the copyright owner did not anticipate the value 
that his or her art could have when used in that way. By allocating 
the burden in that way, the law will assume that ordinarily the copy­
right owner has been able to anticipate such value and has priced 
its works accordingly to capture that value. Only where the proof 
shows otherwise should the copyright owner be able to seek dam­
ages from the derivative user to compensate for that lost value. 
IV. CoNcLusioN 
Both courts and commentators have struggled to define the 
best approach to use in balancing the rights of copyright owners 
with the rights of derivative users in order to best serve the public 
interest in creation of and access to original works of authorship. 
Giving copyright owners too little control may inhibit the creation 
of works by denying those owners the economic rewards needed to 
stimulate creation; giving copyright owners too much control may 
prevent derivative users from being able to improve and build 
upon those underlying works and thus to create new works of au­
thorship. Thus, striking the balance in the right way has implica­
tions not only for creators of works of authorship, but also for the 
public, which benefits from the creation of such works. 
In order to strike that balance appropriately, first one must ask 
whether the derivative use was a public goods use or not. When 
the derivative use is of the "public goods" variety, for example, a 
film based on a novel or a plush toy based on a cartoon character, 
the creator of that underlying work has not been compensated di­
rectly for each use of its work by the derivative user. In such cases, 
the derivative use should be considered infringing because the 
copyright owner will lose some of the value of his or her art's con­
tribution to the derivative work. In statutory terms, the underlying 
148 The concept of "customary use" is not foreign to copyright law. The Supreme Court 
in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, obseiVed that "the fair use doctrine was predicated on the 
author's implied consent to 'reasonable and customary use' when he released his work for 
public consumption." See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 
(Ct. Cl. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (stating that scholar's handwritten copy of copy­
righted article would be fair use as a "customary fact[] of copyright-life"); Harry N. Rosen­
field, Customary Use as "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 220 (1975) (arguing that 
customary use of copyrighted works in non-commercial context should be considered per se 
fair use). 
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work can easily be considered to have been "recast, transformed or 
adapted" since by definition some expressive element of that work 
is now appearing in a different format or medium. This is so be­
cause an actual copy of the work is not in fact incorporated within 
that derivative work. It should not matter whether the change is 
itself "original." 
On the other hand, where the derivative use does incorporate 
an actual copy of the underlying work into each copy of the deriva­
tive work, the concerns are different. In those cases, as long as that 
derivative use is a customary or reasonably expected use of such 
works, the copyright owner has had, at least in theory, an opportu­
nity to calculate the potential value of his or her art's contribution 
to such derivative uses and could have priced that work accordingly 
to capture that value. Thus, the law should not allow the copyright 
owner to hold that derivative user liable, unless the copyright 
owner can prove that the derivative use was not customary or rea­
sonably expected and that therefore there was no realistic opportu­
nity for the copyright owner to receive compensation for that use 
of his or her work. 
Returning finally to the tile art scenario at issue in Mirage and 
Lee, the use of the note cards is clearly not a public goods use since 
every piece of tile art incorporates an actual copy of the underlying 
art work. Thus, that use should not be considered infringing, un­
less the· artist can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
that use was not customary or reasonably expected at the time the 
underlying work was created and distributed. 
